Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the U.S. Treasury, David Cohen
Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced actions targeting a diverse set of entities and individuals located around the world for evading U.S. sanctions against Iran, aiding Iranian nuclear and missile proliferation, and supporting terrorism. These actions reflect the United States’ sustained commitment to continue enforcing our existing sanctions as the P5+1 and Iran work toward a comprehensive solution to address the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.
“The global targets designated today play key roles in supporting Iran’s nuclear program and active support for terrorism. The United States has made clear that as it implements the Joint Plan of Action, contingent on Iran satisfying its own commitments, the overwhelming majority of sanctions remain in effect and will continue to be vigorously enforced,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.
Today’s actions target entities and individuals located across the world, operating in Turkey, Spain, Germany, Georgia, Afghanistan, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Liechtenstein.
The actions under Executive Orders (E.O.) 13224 and 13382 generally prohibit transactions between the designated entities and individuals and any U.S. person, and block any property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction of the designated entities and individuals. In addition, any foreign financial institution or person that facilitates significant transactions or provides material support to the designated entities or individuals may have their access to the U.S. financial system severed or their property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction blocked.
The actions under E.O. 13608 generally prohibit transactions involving the sanctioned persons that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including transactions by U.S. persons, wherever located.
Foreign Sanctions Evaders
Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and Houshang Farsoudeh
Pursuant to E.O. 13608, which targets foreign persons engaged in activities intended to evade U.S. economic and financial sanctions with respect to Iran and Syria, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned Georgia-based Pourya Nayebi, Houshang Hosseinpour, and Houshang Farsoudeh and eight companies owned or controlled by these individuals. These three individuals have established companies and financial institutions in multiple countries, and have used these companies to facilitate deceptive transactions for or on behalf of persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Iran. In 2011, they acquired the majority shares in a licensed Georgian bank with direct correspondent ties to other international financial institutions through a Liechtenstein-based foundation they control. They then used the Georgian bank to facilitate transactions worth the equivalent of tens of millions of U.S. dollars for multiple designated Iranian banks, including Bank Melli, Mir Business Bank, Bank Saderat, and Bank Tejarat.
Nayebi, Hosseinpour, and Farsoudeh deceived the financial regulatory authorities of the Republic of Georgia by withholding required reports of transactions involving Iranian banks. The Government of Georgia has worked closely with the United States to detect and address illicit and deceptive Iranian behavior in Georgia, and it has taken steps to ensure that Iranian entities under U.S. and international sanctions are prevented from exploiting the Georgian financial system.
Treasury is also imposing sanctions on eight companies located in multiple countries that are owned and/or controlled by Nayebi, Hosseinpour, and Farsoudeh (acting individually or together), including: Caucasus Energy (Georgia), Orchidea Gulf Trading (UAE and/or Turkey), Georgian Business Development (Georgia and/or UAE), Great Business Deals (Georgia and/or UAE), KSN Foundation (Liechtenstein), New York General Trading (UAE), New York Money Exchange (UAE and/or Georgia), and European Oil Traders (Switzerland). KSN Foundation was used to disguise the control of the Georgian bank by Nayebi, Hosseinpour, and Farsoudeh, and the other entities were involved in the transactions for designated Iranian banks discussed above. On multiple occasions, these front companies deceived the international financial community, including by generating false invoices in connection with transactions involving designated Iranian banks.
Iran’s Nuclear and Weapons Proliferation Activities
The following entities and individuals are sanctioned pursuant to E.O. 13382, which, among other things, targets weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters.
Ali Canko and the Tiva Sanat Group
Turkish citizen Ali Canko assisted the Iran-based Tiva Sanat Group in its attempts to procure and reverse engineer a weapons-capable fast boat to be used by the IRGC-Navy. The Tiva Sanat Group is comprised of Tiva Kara, Tiva Darya, and Tiva Polymer. Tiva Sanat Group uses front companies to acquire foreign technology and components, with at least one intermediary expressing concern that a payment would be interdicted by the U.S. Treasury because the intermediary falsely claimed to be the end-user for equipment that was intended for Tiva Sanat. Ali Canko has served as a financial intermediary for payments from the Tiva Sanat Group to various international suppliers. The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation-related activities.
Advance Electrical and Industrial Technologies SL and Pere Punti
Advance Electrical and Industrial Technologies SL (AEIT), located in Spain, procures items from foreign suppliers and facilitates financial transactions for the previously E.O. 13382-designated Neka Novin. Spanish citizen Pere Punti is AEIT’s sole shareholder and also arranges to facilitate payments on behalf of Neka Novin. Neka Novin was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in November 2011 for its involvement in the procurement of specialized equipment and materials that have direct application to Iran’s nuclear program.
Ulrich Wippermann, DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft, DF Deutsche Forfait Americas Inc.
German firm DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft (Deutsche Forfait) and Deutsche Forfait board member Ulrich Wippermann facilitated oil deals in circumvention of oil sanctions for NIOC, an entity determined to be an agent or affiliate of the IRGC and designated under E.O. 13382. DF Deutsche Forfait Americas Inc. is the U.S. subsidiary of Deutsche Forfait. NIOC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in November 2012 for providing or attempting to provide, financial, material, or other support for and services in support of the IRGC.
Terrorism – Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Mahan Air
The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today the designation pursuant to E.O. 13224 of key Mahan Air officials and front companies in the UAE that have served as critical conduits for Mahan Air financial payments as well as intermediaries for the airline’s acquisition of aircraft, engines, and other parts. These front companies have served as part of the procurement backbone of Mahan Air, enabling the sanctioned airline to continue ferrying significant quantities of weapons and other illicit cargo into Syria on its own passenger aircraft to support the Assad regime’s violent crackdown against its own citizens. Mahan Air was previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2011 for its support to Iran’s IRGC-QF.
Blue Sky Aviation Co FZE (BSA FZE)
BSA FZE is a UAE-based company that is owned or controlled by Mahan Air and acts for or on behalf of the airline. BSA FZE’s primary function has been to serve as a payment channel for Mahan Air to obscure the origination of funds. Mahan Air has used BSA to make payments to oil suppliers, and purchase aircraft, engines, and parts.
Avia Trust FZE
Avia Trust FZE is another UAE-based company that is owned or controlled by Mahan Air and acts for or on behalf of the airline. Mahan Air has used Avia Trust FZE to procure sanctioned aircraft parts and equipment, to include items that are of U.S.-origin. The IRGC has used Avia Trust FZE as a front to procure aviation-related items, some of which are subject to international sanctions. In addition, the IRGC has used Avia Trust FZE as a front to assist with avoiding customs inspections in the UAE of cargo destined for Iran, some of which included items subject to international sanctions.
Hamidreza Malekouti Pour
Hamidreza Malekouti Pour has served as the regional manager for Mahan Air in the UAE and the managing director of Sirjanco Trading LLC and BSA FZE. Malekouti Pour, operating out of Mahan Air’s office in the UAE, has supplied equipment to the IRGC-QF. Sirjanco Trading LLC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on May 31, 2013, for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard acts for or on behalf of Mahan Air through his actions as the owner of Avia Trust FZEand several other companies engaging in business on behalf of Mahan Air. Kosarayanifard has established agreements with Mahan Air to have Avia Trust FZE serve as a cutout for the repair and overhaul of Mahan Air aircraft engines.Kosarayanifard has also established agreements with Mahan Air to manage the airline’s cargo shipments and is reportedly responsible for IRGC procurement activities in the UAE.
Gholamreza Mahmoudi acts for or on behalf of Mahan Air as a senior official and corporate director at Mahan Air. Mahmoudi has worked closely with Mahan Air Managing Director Hamid Arabnejad on sanctions evasion strategies to acquire U.S. aircraft. Hamid Arabnejad was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on May 31, 2013 for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.
Terrorism – IRGC-QF in Afghanistan
.Today the Department of the Treasury announced the designations pursuant to E.O. 13224 of three IRGC-QF officers and one IRGC-QF associate involved in Iranian efforts in Afghanistan. This action underscores Tehran’s use of terrorism and intelligence operations as tools of influence against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.IRGC-QF utilized now-detained Afghan associate, Sayyed Kamal Musavi, who was designated today, to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan. Two IRGC-QF officers also designated today, Alireza Hemmati and Akbar Seyed Alhosseini, provided logistical support to this associate. Another IRGC-QF officer, Mahmud Afkhami, is being designated today to highlight his influence over Afghan political affairs and his efforts to advance Iranian interests with the Government of the Islamist Republic of Afghanistan.In August 2010, Treasury similarly took action against two IRGC-QF leaders supporting terrorism in Afghanistan and funneling Iranian assistance to the Taliban. Treasury then designated IRGC-QF General Hossein Musavi, the Commander of the IRGC-QF Ansar Corps, whose responsibilities include IRGC-QF activities in Afghanistan. Treasury also designated IRGC-QF Colonel Hasan Mortezavi. Both Musavi and Mortezavi provided funding and material support to the Taliban as part of their official duties as IRGC-QF officers.
Sayyed Kamal Musavi
Sayyed Kamal Musavi is being designated for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF as a facilitator and operational planner. Musavi assisted the IRGC-QF in conducting surveillance and planning terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in 2010 prior to his arrest. Musavi operated in Kabul and was part of an attack cell targeting an Afghan official and was apprehended with associates, who were at the time carrying large quantities of explosives and detonators.
Alireza Hemmati is being designated for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF. Hemmati is an IRGC-QF chief for Afghanistan-focused operations conducted by the IRGC-QF, who provided key logistics support for now detained Afghan associate, Sayyed Kamal Musavi. Hemmati worked closely with Musavi while Musavi plotted attacks in Afghanistan, having sent supplies from Iran to Musavi and arranged travel documents for him. Hemmati is pressing for Musavi’s release from detention.
Akbar Seyed Alhosseini
Akbar Seyed Alhosseini serves as a key IRGC-QF officer who oversees the group’s activities in Afghanistan and is being designated for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF. Seyed Alhosseini previously served as chief of the IRGC-QF’s office in Herat, Afghanistan. He has arranged travel documents and logistics for IRGC-QF officers and associates, including now detained Afghan associate Sayyed Kamal Musavi, prior to Musavi’s arrest.
Mahmud Afkhami Rashidi
Mahmud Afkhami is a high-ranking IRGC-QF official within the elite IRGC-QF operations unit working in Afghanistan and is being designated for acting for or on behalf of the IRGC-QF. Afkhami’s responsibilities include currying favor with Afghan politicians who are sympathetic to Iran to strengthen the Iranian power base in Kabul.
Terrorism – al-Qa’ida’s Network in Iran
Today the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the designation of a key Iran-based al-Qa’ida facilitator who supports al-Qa’ida’s vital facilitation network in Iran, that operates there with the knowledge of Iranian authorities. The network also uses Iran as a transit point for moving funding and foreign fighters through Turkey to support al-Qa’ida-affiliated elements in Syria, including the al-Nusrah Front.
Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov
Treasury today designated Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union facilitator Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (also known as Jafar al-Uzbeki and Jafar Muidinov) for acting for on behalf of and providing support to al-Qa’ida.
Today’s action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, follows Treasury’s designations in July 2011 of Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil (also known as Yasin al-Suri) and October 2012 of Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi, two al-Qa’ida officials who served as the head and deputy of al-Qa’ida’s Iran network, respectively. The State Department also authorized rewards totaling $17 million for information leading to the locations of al-Suri and al-Harbi, and additionally offered $10 million in October 2012 for information leading to the location of Muhsin al-Fadhli, who previously led the Iran-based al-Qa’ida network, and was designated by Treasury and the United Nations in February 2005.
Jafar al-Uzbeki is a member of the Islamic Jihad Union and provides logistical support and funding to al-Qa’ida’s Iran-based network. As an associate of designated al-Qa’ida facilitator Yasin al-Suri, al-Uzbeki serves as a key extremist smuggler based in Mashhad, Iran, near the country’s border with Afghanistan, and has provided visas and passports to numerous foreign fighters, including al-Qa’ida recruits, to facilitate their travel. Al-Uzbeki has assisted extremists and operatives transiting Iran on their way into and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Uzbeki has also provided funding to al-Suri, who has resumed leadership of al-Qa’ida’s Iran-based network after being temporarily detained there in late 2011.
As head al-Qa’ida facilitator in Iran, Yasin al-Suri is responsible for overseeing al-Qa’ida efforts to transfer experienced operatives and leaders from Pakistan to Syria, organizing and maintaining routes by which new recruits can travel to Syria via Turkey, and assisting in the movement of al-Qa’ida external operatives to the West.
Al-Qa’ida’s network in Iran has facilitated the transfer of funds from Gulf-based donors to al-Qa’ida core and other affiliated elements, including the al-Nusrah Front in Syria. The Iran-based al-Qa’ida network has also leveraged an extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to send money to Syria via Turkey.
Refer to the bottom of this page
U.S. Dept of The Treasury – Press Center
February 06, 2014
U.S. Treasury: Iran Helping Al-Qaeda in Syria
BEIRUT: Iran is assisting key Al-Qaeda figures to transfer Sunni fighters into Syria, the Obama administration charged Thursday.
The accusation, detailed in new sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury department targeting Iranian terror links, indicates Iranian officials are backing opposing sides in the Syrian civil war.
Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov, described by the Treasury Department as an Iran-based Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) facilitator, was designated for providing logistical support and funding to Al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network.
Members of the Islamist Syrian rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra ride on a vehicle mounted with an anti-aircraft weapon, along a damaged street in Deir al-Zor, eastern Syria February 5, 2014.
Iranian officials denied the accusations, to the Wall Street Journal, saying Washington was harming diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the international standoff over Tehran’s nuclear program.
According to the Long War Journal, a respected counter-terrorism blog, the IJU is an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Both groups are closely allied with Al-Qaeda.
Sadikov, also known as Jafar al-Uzbeki and Jafar Muidinov, serves as a “key extremist smuggler based in Mashhad, Iran, near the country’s border with Afghanistan, and has provided visas and passports to numerous foreign fighters, including Al-Qaeda recruits, to facilitate their travel,” the Treasury said, adding that “he assisted extremists and operatives transiting Iran on their way into and out of Pakistan and Afghanistan,” the Treasury said.
According to the Treasury statement, Uzbeki has also provided funding to Abdel Aziz Khalil, AKA Yasin al-Suri, who resumed leadership of Al-Qaeda’s Iran-based network after being temporarily detained there in late 2011.
Suri is believed to be responsible for overseeing Al-Qaeda efforts to transfer experienced fighters from Pakistan to Syria. The Treasury said he is involved in organizing and maintaining routes by which new recruits can travel to Syria via Turkey.
The Treasury Department designated Suri in July 2011 and has authorized monetary rewards for information leading to his location.
The Treasury department said the Al-Qaeda network in Iran “has facilitated the transfer of funds from Gulf-based donors to Al-Qaeda core and other affiliated elements, including the Nusra Front in Syria.”
The U.S. has blacklisted the Syria-based Nusra Front as a terrorist organization for links with Al-Qaeda.
“The Iran-based Al-Qaeda network has also leveraged an extensive network of Kuwaiti jihadist donors to send money to Syria via Turkey,” the Treasury added.
Iran is Syrian President Bashar Assad’s closest ally, providing military, financial and diplomatic support. The U.S. has repeatedly accused Iran of using its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to train and deploy Shiite fighters to bolster Assad’s forces.
The Nusra Front is a leading rebel group fighting Assad forces in northern Syria, along the Turkish border and was blacklisted by the U.S. in 2012 as a terrorist organization for links with Al-Qaeda.
The Daily Star – Lebanon News
February 07, 2014
Related link – http://tinyurl.com/l8atucu
“Treasury Targets Networks Linked to Iran” Cont’d:
Name: Pourya Nayebi
AKA: Pourya Ali Asghar Nayebi
DOB: 25 July 1974
Place of Birth: Tehran, Iran
Passport: V11664675 (Iran) Exp. Date: 7 August 2012
Name: Houshang Hosseinpour
AKA: Houshang Hosein-Pur
AKA: Houshang Shahali Hosseinpour
DOB: 21 March 1967
Place of Birth: Tehran, Iran
Passport: R17550559 (Iran) Exp. Date: 11 July 2015
Name: Houshang Farsoudeh
AKA: Hushang Farsoudeh
AKA: Houshang Hossein Farsoudeh
DOB: 10 October 1968
Place of Birth: Tehran, Iran
Passport: H2726141 (Iran)
Name: Caucasus Energy
AKA: LLC Caucasus Energy
AKA: Caucasus Energy of Georgia
Registration #: 406075081
Name: Orchidea Gulf Trading
AKA: Orchidea General Trading LLC
AKA: Orchidea Gulf Exchange Trading Co L
AKA: Orchidea Gulf Coast Trading Co L
AKA: Orchidea Gulf Trading Altin Ve Kiymelti Madenler Dis Tic LTD STI
Address: P.O. Box 11254, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 11254, 6305 Zinath Omar Kin Khatab, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 11256 Zinath Omar Kin Khatab, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 6305 Zinath Omar Kin Khatab, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 85334 Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 85334, Office Number 605, Concord Hotel, Al Matoum Street, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: Molla Gurani Mahallesi Sehit Pilot Nedim Sok. Evirgenler Ish. 5/5, Istanbul, Turkey
Name: Georgian Business Development
AKA: GBD FIZ
AKA: GBD FIZ, LLC
AKA: GBD FIZ Limited
Address: Tbilisi, Georgia
Alt. Address: Plot 545, Unit 1B-8D, Free Industrial Zone, Poti, Georgia
Alt. Address: Deira, Dubai, UAE
Name: Great Business Deals
Address: Tbilisi, Georgia
Alt. Address: Plot 545, Unit 1B-8D, Free Industrial Zone, Poti, Georgia
Alt. Address: Deira, Dubai, UAE
Name: KSN Foundation
Address: Muehleholz 3, Vaduz Liechtenstein, 94490, Liechtenstein
Name: New York General Trading
Address: No. 815, Al Maktoum Building, Al Maktoum St., Deira,
P.O. Box 42108, Dubai, UAE
Registration No.: 547066
Name: New York Money Exchange
Address: P.O. Box 85334, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: Shop 14 Al MM Tower Al Maktoum St, Dubai UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 31138, Abu Dhabi, UAE
Alt Address: P.O. Box 42108, Dubai, UAE
Commercial License No.: 549905, Dubai, UAE
Alt Address: 20 Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi, Georgia
Alt Address: Tbilisi International Airport, Tbilisi, Georgia
Alt Address: Batumi Airport, Batumi, Georgia
Name: European Oil Traders
AKA: European Oil Traders SA
Address: Kaiserstuhlerstrasse 81, 8175 Windlach, Switzerland
Alt Address: 8174 Stadel b. Niederglatt, Switzerland
Name: Tiva Sanat Group
AKA: Tiva Group Industries
AKA: Tiva Sanat Shipbuilding Company
Aka: Tiva Group
Address: Alley 10 and 3/10, No. 10, Behrestan Street, Sajad Boulevard, Mashhad, Iran
Alt Address: Number 4, 11th Narenjestan, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt Address: Number 3, 12th Narenjestan, Pasdaran, Tehran, Iran
Registrations Number 878
Name: Tiva Kara Co. Ltd.
AKA: Tiva Kara Group
Address: 3rd Floor, Block No. 3, North Pasdaran Street, 12th Narenjestan Alley, Before Aghdasie T — Junction Aqdaseya Saraya, Tehran, Iran
Alt Address: Number 3. 12th Narenjestan Alley, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran
Location: Miyaneh, Iran
Alt Address: Bushehr, Iran
Name: Tiva Polymer Co.
Address: Number 3, 12th Narenjestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran, Iran.
Alt Address: Miyaneh, Iran
Name: Tiva Darya
Address: Number 3, 12 Narenjestan Street, Pasdaran Avenue, Tehran.
Alt Address: Bushehr, Iran
Name: Ali Canko
Passport: U 04765836 (Turkey)
Personal ID Card: 58786069032
Alt Personal ID Card: AK 8136255 (Italy)
DOB: 01 Jan 1960
Name: Advance Electrical and Industrial Technologies SL
AKA: Clear Trade Link SL
Address: Passeig Verdauguer, 120, 08700, Igualada, Barcelona, Spain
Name: Pere Punti
AKA: Pedro Punti Sane
Passport: AAD225212 (Spain); Exp. Date: 12 May 2020
DOB: 27 August 1944
Name: Ulrich Wippermann
DOB: 02 May 1956
Title: Member of the Board of Directors, DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft
Name: DF Deutsche Forfait Aktiengesellschaft
AKA: Deutsche Forfait
Address: Kattenbug 18 – 24, Koln, Nordrhein-Westfalen 50667, Germany
Name: DF Deutsche Forfait Americas Inc.
Address: Miami, FL USA
Name: Blue Sky Aviation Co FZE
Address: Al Maktoum Street, al Dana Centre, 3rd Floor, Office No. 306, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Name: Avia Trust FZE
Location: P.O. Box 54541, Dubai, UAE
Name: Hamidreza Malekouti Pour
AKA: Hamidreza Malakotipour
AKA: Hamid Reza Malakotipour
AKA: Hamid Reza Malakutipur
AKA: Hamid Reza Malkotipour
AKA: Hamid Reza Malakoutipour
DOB: October 18, 1960
Iranian Passport: B5660433
Name: Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard
AKA: Kosarian Fard
AKA: Pejman Kosaryani-Fard
AKA: Pejman Kosarian Fard
AKA: Pejman Casaryanifard
AKA: Ali Pejman Mahmud Kosarayan Fard
AKA: Amir Kosarian
DOB: February 27, 1973
P.O. Box: 52404, Dubai, UAE
Name: Gholamreza Mahmoudi
AKA: Qolam Reza Mahmudi
AKA: Gholam Reza Mahmoudi
AKA: Ghulam Reza Khodrat Mahmoudi
DOB: February 3, 1958
Name: Sayyed Kamal Musavi
AKA: Sayyed Kamal Jamali
DOB: January 3. 1958
Name: Alireza Hemmati
DOB: December 1955
Name: Akbar Seyed Alhosseini
AKA: Akbar Seyedolhoseini
AKA: Akbar Sayed Alhosseini
AKA: Akbar Sayedolhusseini
AKA: Akbar Saeed Husaini
AKA: Akbar Sayyed al-Hoseini
DOB: November 22, 1961
POB: Taybad, Iran
Passport Number: D9004309 (issued November 12, 2008, expires November 13, 2013)
Name: Mahmud Afkhami Rashidi
AKA: Mahmoud Afkhami Rashidi
AKA: Mahmood Afkhami Rashidi
DOB: August 31, 1962
POB: Mashhad, Iran
Passport Number: D9005625 (issued July 11, 2009; expires July 11, 2014)
Name: Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov
AKA: Jafar al-Uzbeki
AKA: Jaffar al-Uzbek
AKA: Jafar Muhidinov
AKA: Dilshod Alimovich Muidinov
AKA: Djafar Muidinov
AKA: Jafar Muidinov